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BOOK REVIEW
THE BEST (OR WORST) KEPT SECRET OF
FAILED PUBLIC POLICY: ROAD SAFETY
Traffic Safety by Dr. Leonard Evans. Bloomfield Hills,
Michigan: Science Serving Society, 2004. Pp. 444. Hard
Cover. $99.50.
Reviewed by Kevin M. McDonald*
"Best safety lies in fear."
- Shakespeare, Hamlet (Act I, Scene 3)
Prior to the mid-1960s, the United States boasted the
safest roads in the world.1 As of 2002, it ranks sixteenth.2 In
1966, Congress created the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration ("NHTSA") to oversee the automotive indus-
try.3 The United States automotive market is now the most
regulated in the world. So, has U.S. safety policy failed?
* Attorney, Product & Regulatory Matters, Volkswagen of America, Inc. B.A.,
Kalamazoo College; J.D., Washington University School of Law; L.L. M. Eur.
(Master of European Law) Institute of European Studies, University of the
Saarland, Germany; Dr. jur. (Doctor of Legal Sciences), University of the Saar-
land School of Law and Business Sciences, Germany.. The views and opinions
expressed in this article reflect only those of the author and should not be inter-
preted in any way to reflect those of Volkswagen or Audi, or any of their em-
ployees. Copyright © 2005 Kevin M. McDonald. All rights reserved.
1. LEONARD EVANS, TRAFFIC SAFETY xiii (2004).
2. Id.
3. The NHTSA is a federal agency housed within the Department of Trans-
portation. It is responsible for overseeing large aspects of the automotive indus-
try, including safety and fuel economy. The NHTSA frames its mission to "save
lives, prevent injuries and reduce traffic-related health care and other economic
costs." Long Range Strategic Planning, 69 Fed. Reg. 39,542, 39,543 (June 30,
2004). For additional background on the NHTSA, see Kevin M. McDonald, Ju-
dicial Review of NHTSA-Ordered Recalls, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1301, 1303-22
(2001).
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In his recently published book, Traffic Safety, Dr. Leo-
nard Evans unequivocally answers this question in the af-
firmative.4 Dr. Evans, a physicist by trade and a prolific
scholar on traffic safety,5 posits a straightforward thesis: U.S.
safety policy has failed because, unlike other, safer, countries,
(1) safety policy in the United States is driven by dogmatic at-
torneys, rather than by technically trained scientists, and (2)
policy measures in the United States focus too much on a ve-
hicle's crashworthiness instead of crash prevention.6
To place Dr. Evans's thesis in context, one must first ap-
preciate the impact of traffic crashes on society. Each year,
crashes in the United States kill over 40,000 people and in-
jure, cripple, or disable nearly 3,000,000.7 Vehicle crashes are
the leading cause of death for persons aged three through
thirty-three.8 They also cost the economy roughly $230 billion
annually, which equals approximately 2.3 percent of the en-
tire U.S. gross domestic product, or $820 per person.9
Dr. Evans constructs his case methodically, relying on a
wealth of data gathered from the NHTSA and other safety
agencies world wide. Using the year 1966 (when Congress
created the NHTSA) as his baseline, Dr. Evans shows that
the United States once had the safest roads in the world,
whether measured by deaths per registered vehicle or deaths
for the same unit of distance traveled."
By 2002, however, as measured by deaths per registered
4. EVANS, supra note 1.
5. Dr. Evans has published over 150 articles on traffic safety. Id. at 445.
He currently serves as president of Science Serving Society, an organization he
formed to continue research and other professional activities after having
worked for thirty-three years at General Motors Corporation. Id.
6. See id. 408. Crashworthiness, or crash protection, "refers to engineering
features aimed at reducing losses, given that a specific crash occurs," (e.g., air-
bags, safety belts, collapsible steering columns). Id. at 8. Crash prevention "re-
fers to measures aimed at preventing the crash from occurring" at all (e.g., im-
proved braking, better driver training, stricter traffic laws, etc.). Id.
7. See Press Release No. 35-04, National Highway Traffic Safety Admini-
stration, DOT Announces Historic Low Highway Fatality Rate in 2003 (Aug. 10,
2004), http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
8. See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Leading Causes of
Death 2002 Web page, at http://nhtsa.gov/people/Crash/LCOD/index.htm (last
visited on Apr. 12, 2005).
9. See Press Release NHTSA-04, National Highway Traffic Safety Admini-
stration, DOT Releases Preliminary Estimates of 2003 Highway Fatalities
(Apr. 28, 2004), http:www.nhtsa.dot.gov (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
10. EVANS, supra note 1, at 381.
1048 Vol:45
BOOK REVIEW
vehicle, the United States had dropped from first place into
sixteenth place." Measured by deaths for the same distance
of travel, the United States had dropped from first place into
tenth place."2
Using either measure, the drop in the safety ranking is
significant. Had the United States mirrored the safety im-
provements achieved in Canada, Great Britain, and Australia
from 1979-2002, Dr. Evans estimates that it would have had
a little over 26,000 deaths in 2002 instead of 42,815 deaths. 8
Put differently, starting in 1979, if the U.S. fatality rate had
declined each year by the same percentage as the fatality rate
drop in Great Britain, an estimated 177,593 fewer Americans
would have died in that 23-year period.
4
So, what happened? In line with Shakespeare's plea to
"first, kill all the lawyers,"5 Dr. Evans blames the dispropor-
tionate amount of influence attorneys in the United States
(and within the NHTSA) exercised over safety policy: "US pol-
icy was defined and led by ideologically driven lawyers lack-
ing knowledge or interest in technical matters."6 Without
technical expertise, attorneys distorted priorities to be "per-
fectly opposite to where technical knowledge shows benefits
are greatest."7 Such influence and distortion of priorities are
"without parallel in any other country."8
11. Id. The United States lagged behind Australia, Austria, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, Japan, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Id.
12. Id. at 385.
13. Id. at 387.
14. Id. Had the United States matched Australia's decline in fatality rate
between 1979-2002, nearly 208,000 fewer U.S. fatalities would have occurred.
Id.
15. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH
act 4., sc. 2. In a morbid sense, Shakespeare's plea has been heard, at least on
the roads. According to the results of a recent study conducted by the Quality
Planning Corporation, a California-based company that helps insurance compa-
nies rate driver risk, lawyers rate in the top five most crash-prone professions.
See Tom Greenwood, Students, Doctors Rate as the Most Crash-Prone, DETROIT
NEWS, Feb. 17, 2005, at 8B. The study lasted eighteen months and covered
forty professions. Id. It found that fifteen percent of students studied were in-
volved in crashes, eleven percent of doctors, 10.6 percent of lawyers, 10.5 per-
cent of architects, and 10.2 percent of real estate agents. Id. Perhaps there is
indeed a kernel of truth to the maxim that lawyers are always first at the scene
of a crash.
16. EVANS, supra note 1, at 389.
17. Id.
18. Id.
2005 1049
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
For example, Dr. Evans claims the airbag 9 mandate
pushed aggressively by the NHTSA was not grounded in
sound technical evidence.20 According to Dr. Evans, NHTSA
administrator Joan Claybrook (an attorney and Ralph Nader
prot6g6), denied the effectiveness of safety belts in order to
justify the airbag mandate.2 ' One of Ms. Claybrook's justifica-
tions for airbag mandates was that their installation cost
would be partially offset by cost savings from removing safety
belts, even though the technical literature documented that
airbags could not come close to the effectiveness of safety
belts; safety belts reduce driver fatality risk by forty-two per-
cent, and airbags only reduce driver fatality risk by eight per-
cent.22
While other countries during the 1970s and 1980s were
following the lead of Canada and Australia by passing man-
datory safety belt laws, thus reducing fatality rates, the
United States focused its priorities on mandating airbags.
Australian safety policy, which even today does not mandate
airbags, 3 proudly boasts a ninety-five percent belt usage rate,
which is the highest in the world, along with some of the low-
est fatality rates. 4 In contrast, U.S. safety policy long ignored
safety belt usage, because "[a]irbag-mandate enthusiasts saw
belt laws as a threat to their airbag campaign."25 By focusing
disproportionate time and effort on forcing an airbag man-
date, the NHTSA consciously ignored the far more important
message of encouraging safety belt usage. At the time, in a
television interview Ms. Claybrook claimed that airbags were
"much better than seat belts,"26 an assertion never supported
by the data.
As a result of this type of mistaken priority, the United
States has lagged behind other countries in reducing fatality
rates. Dr. Evans blames this lag in part on the United States
19. "Treating airbag as one word [as opposed to two words] is a clear
choice-it shortens, simplifies, and avoids ambiguities." Id. at 7.
20. Id. at 392-97.
21. Id. at 396-97.
22. See EVANS, supra note 1, at 392-94.
23. For additional information on Australia's position on airbags, see the
Australian Department of Transport and Regional Services website,
http://www.dotars.gov.au/transreg/str airbag.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
24. Id.
25. EVANS, supra note 1, at 396.
26. Id.
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having reacted later than other countries in passing safety
belt laws. For example, the first safety belt law in the United
States was enacted in New York in 1984, whereas Canada's
first province to mandate safety belt usage was Ontario in
1976.27 This lag has forced the United States to play "catch
up"; the U.S. safety belt usage rate is only now approaching
seventy to eighty percent.28
Aside from dogmatic attorneys bent on mandating air-
bags, Dr. Evans argues that the NHTSA follows a fundamen-
tally flawed regulatory policy, and that its focus should be on
crash prevention instead of crashworthiness.29 From 1979 to
2002, over 200,000 more Americans were killed in traffic than
would have been killed if the United States had focused on
crash prevention measures found in countries with lower fa-
tality rates, such as Canada, Australia, or Great Britain.' °
The effective crash prevention techniques employed by the
"safer" countries include: (1) strict safety belt usage laws; (2)
strict laws against driving while intoxicated (including the
use of random sobriety check lanes); (3) helmet laws for mo-
torcyclists; (4) speed limits based on scientific data, not politi-
cal opportunity; and, (5) banning radar detectors, whose sole
raison d'6tre is to violate traffic law.3'
Not surprisingly, Dr. Evans has provoked a range of crit-
ics. Drs. Jon Vernick and Stephen Teret, both of the Johns
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, take issue with
blaming attorneys for failed safety policy. According to them,
"it is well documented [that the influence of attorneys]
against motor vehicle... manufacturers has made important
contributions to public health, providing necessary incentives
to make products safer."32 Drs. Vernick and Teret also ques-
tion Dr. Evans's criticism of the airbag mandate: "We doubt
that the families of people killed in vehicles without safety
devices such as air bags [sic]--especially during the period
when General Motors and other car manufacturers fought the
27. Id. at 404.
28. See id. at 405. See also Press Release 46-04, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, New Data Show Rising Safety Belt Use Rates in Most
States (Nov. 23, 2004), http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
29. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
30. EVANS, supra note 1, at xiii.
31. See id. at 302, 406-7.
32. See Jon S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, Making Vehicles Safer, 94 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 170 (Feb. 2004).
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imposition of the federal standard requiring them-would
agree [with Dr. Evans].""
Although attorneys and the NHTSA bear part of the
blame, Dr. Evans points out that individual responsibility (or
lack thereof) bears a part, as well. He convincingly dissuades
readers of the notion that crashes are inevitable aspects of
modern society. Dr. Evans demonstrates, through data, that
most crashes could be avoided if drivers simply made more
responsible choices, such as wearing their safety belts, follow-
ing the speed limit or not driving drunk.
Turning to the format of Traffic Safety, readers will find
this book easy to reference. The well-defined sixteen chapters
are neatly organized, and each can be read on its own. Three
chapters are of particular interest to attorneys and policy-
makers: Chapter 13 ("Measures to improve traffic safety");
34
chapter 15 ("The dramatic failure of US safety policy); 35 and
chapter 16 ("Vision for a safer tomorrow"). 3' The book makes
extensive use of graphical and tabular presentations, which
assist the reader in assimilating the substantial amount of
data. However, readers unaccustomed to sifting through
graphs and tables may at first find this book difficult to read.
Dr. Evans's style is unique and often light-hearted. Far
from offering dry analysis, he writes clearly and concisely, of-
ten offering bits of his British humor.37 On parlance, he in-
structs the reader to refer to a vehicle "striking anything" as
a "crash" and shuns the term "accident," chastising it for
"convey[ing] a sense that the losses are due exclusively to fate
[and] also for convey[ing] a sense that losses are devoid of
predictability."38
In conclusion, Dr. Evans proves that he can argue and
present a case just as compellingly as a polished trial lawyer.
Traffic Safety is a useful book for anyone interested in road
safety. Readers can easily reference the book for an overview
33. Id.
34. EVANS, supra note 1, at 332.
35. Id. at 381.
36. Id. at 412.
37. In warning against drawing conclusions from averages, Dr. Evans ad-
vises: "Averages should be interpreted with a caution well captured in the quip:
An average is like a bikini swimsuit - what it reveals is interesting, but what it
conceals is crucial. It has been remarked that the average human has approxi-
mately one breast and one testicle." Id. at 60.
38. Id. at 6.
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of narrower issues, such as airbag benefits and costs, driver
behavior, the effect of alcohol on safety, and NHTSA policy.
Far from serving as "just" a treatise, however, the book pro-
vides critical analyses of each topic addressed. For this rea-
son, policymakers (including agency officials and congres-
sional staff) in particular may find Traffic Safety helpful.
Hopefully, the book will enjoy a wide audience and dissuade
Dr. Evans of his notion that "[o]ne of the most remarkable
features of the extraordinary failure of US policy is that it is
one of the nation's best-kept secrets."3 9
Postscript: Since acceptance of this book review for publi-
cation, the NHTSA has announced a policy change. In a
speech to the Automotive News World Congress in January
2005, Dr. Jeffrey Runge, Administrator of the NHTSA, de-
clared: "We are reaching the point of diminishing returns
from efforts on crashworthiness, . . . [wie can make big gains
by focusing on crash avoidance."'40 Without wanting to com-
mit the "post hoc" fallacy of false cause, is it possible to infer
the influence of Dr. Evans from this announced policy shift?
After all, this shift seems to square with the shift advocated by
Dr. Evans. However, the NHTSA appears to differ with Dr.
Evans on the definition of crash avoidance (or crash preven-
tion), because it considers crash avoidance measures to in-
clude mandating even more buzzers and warnings, like lane
departure warnings, to the continued exclusion of behavior-
based crash prevention measures highlighted by Dr. Evans.
For this reason, it is highly doubtful that NHTSA's policy
"shift" would enjoy Dr. Evans's approbation, at least not yet.
39. EVANS. supra note 1. at 389.
40. See Dale Jewett, NHTSA Shifting Focus to Active Safety, Runge Says,
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Jan. 24, 2005, at 102.
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